The global financial system came close to collapse in late 2008 and early 2009, following the failure of Lehman Brothers.
World trade, capital flows and economic activity experienced sharp and synchronised contractions, brought on by the severe financial stress and freezing of credit markets.
Policy makers around the world responded with unprecedented action – monetary policy was loosened, large amounts of liquidity were injected into the markets, bank rescue plans and support measures were introduced or augmented, and substantial fiscal stimulus packages were announced.
The raft of policy measures appears to have helped stabilise the global financial system and set the stage for economic recovery. Economic activity has bottomed out and begun to recover. Funding market conditions have eased. Banks are generally better capitalised than at the start of 2009. In response to improving economic conditions, investor risk appetite has returned, triggering a strong rebound in financial markets.
Barring further disruptions, the central outlook for the G3 points to a gradual recovery in 2010. Financial market conditions should improve with the recovery although credit losses are expected to persist for some time as the credit cycle runs its course and defaults continue to rise. The extreme financial stress and collapse in world demand in late 2008 led to some turbulence in Asian financial markets and a sharp fall in economic growth throughout the region. Nonetheless, as Asian economies had entered the turmoil with stronger macroeconomic and financial fundamentals than before the Asian financial crisis and Asian financial institutions had limited direct exposure to troubled assets, financial stress indicators did not reach the levels experienced during the previous crisis. Swift policy responses, combining substantial fiscal and monetary stimuli and other support measures, also helped. Global inventory rebuilding provided a further fillip to growth.
As a result, Asia’s recovery has been sharper and faster than expected, with a significant rebound in GDP growth since Q2 2009. Banking systems in the region have remained resilient, and credit spreads have narrowed to close to their pre-September 2008 levels. We expect Asian economies to continue to recover through 2010, although GDP growth rates would likely be below their long-term averages. There are however several downside risks to this external outlook which the FSR highlights.
G3
Against this uncertain backdrop, authorities must be cautious about removing support measures prematurely and undermining market confidence. But as the near-term fog lifts, risk would need to be transferred back to the private sector to avoid further strains on public finances. Moreover, moral hazard and expectations of government support could sow the seeds of future excesses.
Asia
The Singapore economy contracted in Q4 2008 and Q1 2009, but has since posted two quarters of strong sequential growth. For the whole of 2009, GDP growth is projected to come in at between -2.5% and -2%, a much less adverse outcome than expected early this year. The corporate and household sectors have thus far weathered the economic slowdown relatively well on the back of strong balance sheets and Government policies such as the Special Risk-Sharing Initiative and the Jobs Credit Scheme. Turning to the financial sector, banks and insurers have remained resilient through the crisis, maintaining high capital and liquidity ratios. The local banks’ earnings have dipped but remained above market expectations. This, together with successful capital raising efforts during the crisis, should enable the local banks to absorb further credit losses in the coming quarters. Domestic financial conditions should continue to improve as the economy recovers.
However, the situation in the domestic financial system is not without downside risks. First, the sustainability of the global economic recovery remains uncertain and any adverse shock would weigh on the performance of the Singapore economy given its openness. Should economic recovery stall, corporate earnings may come under renewed strain and corporate refinancing may become more difficult.
Unemployment may also rise if the economy slows again. The knock-on effects on consumer and corporate repayment capability could impair banks’ asset quality, resulting in higher non-performing loans (NPLs) and provisioning charges. Loan growth could moderate again, holding back the recovery.
Second, despite the lingering uncertainties in the domestic and global economy, domestic property market activity has taken on its own dynamic. The Government introduced several measures in September 2009 to temper the exuberance in the market and pre-empt any speculative bubble from forming. As Singapore emerges from recession and with the market expecting low interest rates to persist for some time, the risk of a renewed escalation of speculative momentum cannot be discounted.
More measures might then be necessary. The nature and timing of such measures would have to be balanced against the still uncertain path of economic recovery.
As the economy recovers, MAS will continue to monitor global and domestic developments closely and stands ready to address any potential threat to Singapore’s financial system.
Macroeconomic Surveillance Department
Monetary Authority of Singapore
9 November 2009
Topics: capital flows, credit markets, economic activity, Economy, financial markets, Financial Stability Review, global financial collapse, global financial system, global recession, Governance, Lehman Brothers, liquidity, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Singapore, support measures
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